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COMMENT
PUTTING TEETH INTO A.B. 109: WHY
CALIFORNIA’S HISTORIC PUBLIC
SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT SHOULD
REQUIRE REENTRY PROGRAMMING

KATHLEEN NYE FLYNN*
Reentry processes fail for several reasons—inadequate
programming, inadequate resources, punitive approaches, and mixed
messages to all sorts of stakeholders. The confusing and conflicting
messages of current programming merely serve to delegitimize the
reentry process (and correctional programming), and to contribute to the
cynicism that society does not desire for offenders to succeed.
—FAYE S. TAXMAN 1

INTRODUCTION
In April 2011, Governor Jerry Brown orchestrated the most
significant change to California’s prison system in the state’s recent
history:2 the passage of the Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011, also
*J.D., 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA; M.A. Journalism,
2008, Columbia University, New York, NY; B.A., double major in Political Science and Journalism,
2004, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA. I wish to thank Steven for his endless
encouragement, my newborn daughter for her patience during the revision process, and her
grandparents for caring for her, even when her patience ran out. Thank you also to Alexandra
Vesalga for her support, and to the academics, officials, students and advocates who have produced
such an interesting body of research on this topic.
1
Faye S. Taxman, The Cattle Call of Reentry, Not All Processes Are Equal, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 925, 934-35 (2011).
2
For example, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation calls it
“historic” and the “cornerstone of California’s solution for reducing the number of inmates” in the
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known by its primary bill, Assembly Bill 109.3 The Act, which took
effect in October 2011, set out to transfer an estimated fifty thousand
people from state supervision to the control of county probation and
sheriffs’ departments.4 Another estimated thirty thousand people who
would otherwise have been sentenced to state prison will reside in county
jails.5 The result is that county jails now serve more inmates, and the
State is relying more than ever on local social-service providers to help
former inmates reenter mainstream society.6
Realignment has
dramatically impacted county government and courts, people in prison
and those being released into parole, as well as local communities.7
Overall, it is vastly transforming the role of probation by encouraging

State’s prisons. Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION,
www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
3
A.B. 109, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). In accordance with local practice, this
Comment will use the abbreviation “A.B.” to cite California Assembly Bills. Although the prison
realignment is most often referred to as “A.B. 109” by local officials and the media, realignment
encompasses various bills, including modifying bill A.B. 117, 2011 Leg., Comm. on Budget (Cal.
2011); A.B. 118, 2011 Leg., Comm. on Budget (Cal. 2011); S.B. 89, 2013 Comm. on Budget and
Fiscal Review (Cal. 2013).
4
DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT: ONE YEAR
LATER 6 (Aug. 2012), available at www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_812DMR.pdf.
5
Id. To clarify, in California, probation and parole both involve supervision of criminal
offenders in the counties of which they were residents prior to committing their crimes. However,
parole specifically refers to felony offenders who were sentenced to state prison and who have been
released to state officials after completing a portion of their state-prison sentences. Meanwhile,
probation occurs only on a county level and is a sentencing option for offenders who have
committed either misdemeanors or felonies. Probation officers are responsible for connecting
offenders with other stakeholders in the system, such as law enforcement, the courts, communitybased organizations, mental health departments, substance abuse clinics, and the community. See
MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA’S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1996), available at www.library.ca.gov/crb/96/06/96006.pdf.
6
See generally CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES ET AL., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY
REALIGNMENT, KEY PROVISIONS IN AB 109/AB 117: ADULT OFFENDERS POPULATION TRANSFERS
TO COUNTIES (2011), available at www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/committees/
forensics/1107_forensics/csac-cssa-cpoc_2011_public_safety_realignment_key_provisions_(7-2211).pdf [hereinafter KEY PROVISIONS]. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(6) (Westlaw 2013)
(“Community-based corrections programs require a partnership between local public safety entities
and the county to provide and expand the use of community-based punishment for low-level
offender populations.”). The specific changes created by realignment are discussed infra Part I.D.
7
See generally KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, for an overview of how realignment affects
county governments, courts, parolees, and communities. The legislation also involves changing the
definitions of a number of crimes, enabling counties to make more use of electronic monitoring of
offenders, and changing rules governing good-time credits. While the legislation has many
components that impact jails, the district attorneys’ and public defenders’ offices, sentencing limits,
good behavior credits, adult protective services, child welfare programs, adult proactive services,
and juvenile justice, this Comment will primarily outline its effect on county probation departments’
rehabilitation efforts.
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counties to focus on rehabilitation and lowered recidivism.8 However,
despite the sweeping changes that realignment generated and its
grandiose goals of reducing recidivism through rehabilitation, it does not
require that counties put forward the resources, supervision, and funding
necessary to make lasting, systemic changes to how incarcerated people
reintegrate back into society.9 Without sufficient state directives and
resources counties may not establish the rehabilitation services needed to
reduce recidivism.10
The need for reentry reform in the state is clear from the numbers:
at its height in 2005, the state parole recidivism rate reached 67.5%—
meaning that nearly seven out of ten people who left prison returned
within three years after release.11 Recidivism rates were high on the
county level as well: nearly 40% of people on probation returned to jail,
and many of those people wound up in state prison.12 This recidivism, in
8

MISCZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 7; see also MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE,
2011 REALIGNMENT: ADDRESSING ISSUES TO PROMOTE ITS LONG-TERM SUCCESS 1 (Aug. 19,
2011), available at www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/stadm/realignment/realignment_081911.pdf (“The
2011 realignment legislation is complex and wide sweeping.”).
9
See ALLEN HOPPER ET AL., ACLU OF N. CAL., COMMUNITY SAFETY, COMMUNITY
SOLUTIONS: IMPLEMENTING AB 109: ENHANCING PUBLIC MONEY AND WISELY ALLOCATING JAIL
SPACE 5 (Aug. 2011), available at www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file459
_10684.pdf (explaining that the intent of realignment is for counties to “focus on non-incarceration
alternatives” because counties “will not have the resources” to either build new jail beds or contract
their new jail population back to the State (which is one of the options built into A.B. 109
legislation)).
10
ALLEN HOPPER ET AL., ACLU OF N. CAL., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT, CALIFORNIA
AT THE CROSSROADS 12 (Mar. 2012), available at www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/public_
safety_realignment_california_at_a_crossroads.pdf. For the purposes of this Comment, “reentry”
and “rehabilitative services” as part of a probationary sentence refer broadly to such programs as
housing services (including short- and long-term accommodations), employment services, vocational
training, substance abuse programs, mental health services, expungement programs, educational
programs, and family-strengthening programs. These are addressed broadly, as populations will
have different needs and require different types of services, and programs can vary. Many of these
programs are mentioned in A.B. 117 but are not made mandatory. See Cal. A.B. 117, discussed at
length infra Part III.
11
CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2012 OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT 13 fig.1 (Oct.
2012),
available
at
www.cdcr.ca.gov/adult_research_branch/Research_Documents/ARB_FY_0708_Recidivism_Report
_10.23.12.pdf (the recidivism rate is measured based on a parolee’s return to prison within three
years of release). But see PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR
TO AMERICA’S PRISONS 17 (Apr. 2011), available at www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpew
trustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons
%20.pdf (explaining that 40% of California’s recidivism is due to parolees violating parole, as
opposed to committing new crimes, partly due to the fact that most parolees must remain on parole
for three years).
12
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, ACHIEVING BETTER OUTCOMES FOR ADULT
PROBATION, fig.10 (May 29, 2009), available at www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/Probation/probation
_052909.aspx.
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part, resulted in a population crisis within California’s prisons: at their
peak, prisons were at 200% of capacity.13 A system designed to hold just
under 80,000 people had a population more than twice that.14 This crisis
came to a head in Brown v. Plata, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that overcrowding in California’s prisons amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment.15 The Court upheld the lower court’s order requiring
California to reduce its prison population to 137% of design capacity by
the end of 2013.16 Before the Court had even rendered its verdict,
Governor Brown responded by drafting realignment measures.17
While A.B. 109’s ink was still drying, many of California’s fiftyeight counties began to create realignment plans, following guidelines set
by statute, in order to prepare for its hasty implementation.18 The Act
suggested that counties include strategies to reduce recidivism through
reentry programs, but because the State did not make these efforts
mandatory, there has been no guarantee that any particular county will
put the necessary resources toward these services.19 Indeed, a recent

13

Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923-24 (2011).
Id.
15
For a detailed account of the litigation process that culminated in the Supreme Court’s
decision, see Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and
Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 178 (2013).
16
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1945, 1947. The original deadline for reducing the population to
137.5% of capacity was June 2013, but the three-judge panel overseeing the State’s progress gave a
six-month extension until the end of 2013. Bob Egelko, Extension Given To Cut Prison Population,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 2013, available at www.sfgate.com/news/article/Extension-given-to-cutprison-population-4237201.php.
17
Schlanger, supra note 15, at 184.
18
Counties were required to adopt realignment plans by Oct. 1, 2011. A.B. 109 mandated
the formation of an Executive Committee within each county’s Community Corrections Partnership,
a governing body each county created under a 2009 statute, S.B. 678. CAL. PENAL CODE §§12281233.8 (Westlaw 2012). Each county’s realignment plan was created by the Executive Committee,
which is composed of the district attorney, the public defender, the presiding judge, the police chief,
a public-health or social-services director, and the probation chief. Each county’s board of
supervisors was required to approve the plan. KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 4. News media
across the state reported on the creation of these plans. See, e.g., Julie Small, California Counties To
Take Responsibility for Low-Level Felons, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 22, 2011),
www.scpr.org/news/2011/09/22/29010/california-counties-prepare-take-responsibility-lo/ (quoting
Jerry Powers, Chief Probation Officer for Stanislaus County: “Up and down the state talking to my
colleagues, there’s a lot of planning going on and a lot of discussion with sheriffs, and courts and
community-based organizations, and Oct. 1 it’s coming—we don’t have a choice. We will take care
of it. And come Oct. 1 we’ll be ready to go.”).
19
See, e.g., MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE THE 2012-13 BUDGET: THE
2011 REALIGNMENT OF ADULT OFFENDERS—AN UPDATE 9-10 (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter 20122013 BUDGET], available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports/docs/External-Reports/2011-realignment-ofadult-offenders-022212.pdf (providing a breakdown on how county plans have specified funding
allocations); see also KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 3 (“Supervision and case plans are not
14
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study that reviewed the impact of realignment one year after
implementation found that counties have spent only 12% of their
realignment funding on community agencies that provide rehabilitation
services.20 Realignment recognizes that the treatment of newly released
inmates greatly contributes to reducing recidivism. However, a policy
with these intentions must mandate that counties provide rehabilitation
programs to people exiting incarceration. Otherwise, prison reform to
the extent the State intended—and the U.S. Supreme Court demanded—
will not succeed.
Part I of this Comment provides a history of probation reform
policies in California and an overview of realignment and its preceding
litigation, with a focus on components that relate to rehabilitation in postrelease. Part II explores how Plata laid the groundwork for California’s
current focus on reform and demonstrates how realignment hinges on
changing the role of probation, slowing recidivism, and improving
rehabilitation opportunities. Part III argues that the State should provide
mandatory guidelines for county rehabilitation efforts as part of
realignment. Finally, Part IV recommends statutory language that would
make rehabilitative programming for probationers a mandatory
component of the regulations moving forward.
I. THE LONG ROAD TO THE PRISON REALIGNMENT ACT OF 2011
The road to California’s most recent attempt at prison realignment
has been long and vexing, marked by failed attempts at reducing the
population of state prisons and by funding and sentencing systems that
have only increased the number of people that counties send to prisons.21
An examination of California’s most recent prison crisis requires a brief
review of the state’s history of probation reform, starting in 1965 with
the Probation Subsidy Act and culminating with Brown v. Plata, which
resulted in the Supreme Court mandating that the State reduce its prison
population.22
This litigation led to the Community Corrections
Performance Incentive Act of 2009 (CCPI), also known as S.B. 67823—
specified in [the] statute.”); List of County Plans, CALREALIGNMENT.ORG, www.calrealignment.
org/county-implementation/list-of-county-plans.html (last visited May 21, 2013).
20
Joan Petersilia & Jessica Greenlick Snyder, Looking Past the Hype: 10 Questions
Everyone Should Ask About California’s Prison Realignment, 5 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 266, 275
(2013).
21
See generally Roger K. Warren, Probation Reform in California: Senate Bill 678, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 186 (Feb. 2010), available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/probate-sb678.pdf.
22
Id.; see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
23
S.B. 678, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), adding CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12281233.8 (Westlaw 2012).
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the State’s initial attempt at responding to the recent litigation—and the
Realignment Act of 2011, which mandated for the first time in the
State’s history that a high percentage of low-level felons be transferred to
county control.24
A. CALIFORNIA’S PROBATION POLICY HISTORY
California is one of two states in the nation that leaves the
responsibility for probation to each of its individual fifty-eight counties,
providing almost no cohesive statewide guidance.25 With the exception
of available state grants, counties rely primarily on local funding for
what can be very extensive probation departments.26 This leads to
tremendous disparity in the way counties sentence people, whom they
send to prison or jail, who is released on probation, and what happens
when that probation is revoked.27 Indeed, a recent study compared two
similar-sized counties with similar crime rates, finding that one county
imprisoned new felons at a rate of more than three times the other and
put more than twice the number of people into prison per year than the
other.28
California has made multiple attempts to encourage counties to
retain offenders in county control rather than in state prison, beginning in
24

A.B. 109, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 21, at 186 (“California is one of only two states in the nation
that does not provide an ongoing stream of funding to support adult probation services. California is
also among a dwindling number of states that have no state system of community corrections.”).
26
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12. Counties receive on average two thirds
of the funding for probation departments locally, and one fourth from the State. Other funding
comes from fees that probationers pay to receive certain rehabilitation services, as well as the federal
government. The LAO estimates that in 2007 county probation departments “spent a total of about
$2 billion for adult and juvenile supervision as well as juvenile detention facilities.” Id. at 6.
However, the amount of state funding has since increased, with the implementation of S.B. 678 in
2009, which provides incentive funding for counties that limit the number of people they send to
prison. See Cal. S.B. 678. This will be examined infra Part IV.
27
DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL
RELATIONSHIP: CORRECTIONS 25 (Aug. 2011), available at www.ppic.org/content/pubs/
report/R_811DMR.pdf (“There are differences in the way counties charge and prosecute crimes, in
the amount of jail time prisoners serve, and in the amount of rehabilitative programming they
receive. Realignment increases the class of prisoners affected, applies these differences to prisoners
serving longer sentences, and, importantly, increases the discretion that counties have to manage
their prisoners.”).
28
The study involved Alameda and San Bernardino Counties. A ten-year average of county
data showed that both counties had similarly sized populations and similar amounts of reported
violent crime and property crime. However, San Bernardino County sent “more than three times as
many ‘new felons’ to prison each year.” W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime):
How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why It Should,
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 994 (2012).
25
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earnest with the California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965.29 This Act
grew from the notion that in order to keep prison populations low,
rehabilitation of the offenders had to occur within the community.30 The
Act provided counties with $4,000 for each person diverted from state
prison, altogether redirecting 45,000 offenders from state prison to
county supervision.31 However, the Act was replaced in 1978 for reasons
including the fact that the $4,000 funding rate was never increased to
account for inflation and consequently failed to continue to motivate
counties to retain their own offenders;32 in addition, as California’s
sentencing policies grew increasingly strict,33 and courts began
dispensing more and more felony sentences, the State could not keep up
with the cost of the increasing offender population.34 Critics faulted the
Act for incentivizing counties to keep dangerous offenders in the
community and for lacking performance measurements with which to
track the success of the programs.35 Most importantly, counties never
installed the types of rehabilitation services, such as halfway houses and
day service centers, that could truly reduce recidivism rates.36
The next significant effort toward reform took place in the 1990s,
beginning with the Community-Based Punishment Act of 1994.37
Although the intent was to provide continuous funding for probation
programs, a sufficient funding stream never emerged.38 The State
attempted several grant programs in the 1990s, but those programs failed
as well.39 Simultaneously, the State enacted increasingly tougher
sentencing policies, such as the “Three Strikes and You’re Out” laws

29

NIETO, supra note 5, at 8.
STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STATE/COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS IN
CALIFORNIA: AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.pew.org/uploaded
Files/CA%20State-County%20Partnerships%20paper.pdf.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 2.
33
Three factors contributed most significantly to the rise in the prison population:
determinate sentencing, passed in 1976; the enactment of the “Three Strikes, You’re Out” law in
1994; and changes in local law enforcement and the prosecution of first-time felons, mostly
occurring between 1987 and 2007. For a brief background on these laws and policy shifts, see CAL.
BUDGET PROJECT, STEADY CLIMB: STATE CORRECTIONS SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA 8 (Sept. 2011),
available at www.cbp.org/pdfs/2011/110914_Corrections_Spending_BB.pdf.
34
NIETO, supra note 5, at 9.
35
Warren, supra note 21, at 190.
36
NIETO, supra note 5, at 9
37
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 8050-8093 (Westlaw 2013).
38
Jessica Feinstein, Reforming Adult Felony Probation To Ease Prison Overcrowding: An
Overview of California S.B. 678, 14 CHAPMAN L. REV. 375, 387-88 (2011).
39
Id. at 388.
30
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passed by the Legislature and by voters in 1994.40 Stricter sentencing
resulted in second- and third-strikers becoming one quarter of the state
prison population.41 Courts began to sentence so many people to prison
that a felony arrest in 2007 “was almost twice as likely to result in a
prison sentence” than it was twenty years prior.42 By 2007, the prison
population was severely strained: designed to cage only about 80,000
people, it held approximately 172,000.43
B. BROWN V. PLATA AND ITS PRECEDING LITIGATION
In Brown v. Plata, California prisoners sued the State over prison
conditions that they claimed violated their Eighth Amendment rights.44
Nearly two decades of litigation preceded the case, beginning with
Coleman v. Wilson, in which incarcerated persons with mental illness
sued the State for not providing adequate care.45 In 1995, a district court
issued a series of remedies to improve the situation, to be overseen by a
special master.46 Twelve years later, the special master reported that the
prison mental health system had actually worsened.47 In 2001, in Plata
v. Brown, a class of prisoners with serious medical conditions sued the
State over Eighth Amendment violations, asserting that the lack of
adequate prison medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment.48
Four years after approving injunctive relief for the plaintiffs, the district
court found that the prison system’s medical care was still “resulting in
an ‘unconscionable’ degree of suffering and death.”49 The district court

40

Specifically, in 2010 state prisons housed 34,365 second-strikers and 8,667 third-strikers,
which totaled more than a quarter of all inmates. CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, supra note 33, at 8; see
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)–(j) (Westlaw 2013) (“Three Strikes” law enacted by Legislature);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (Westlaw 2013) (“Three Strikes” law enacted by electorate).
41
Id.; see also DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., PRISON CENSUS DATA AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010
(Feb. 2011), tbl.1., available at www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_
services_branch/Annual/Census/CENSUSd1012.pdf.
42
CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, supra note 33, at 8 (quoting 2009-2010 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S
OFFICE, BUDGET ANALYSIS SERIES: JUDICIAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at CJ-13 (Jan. 30, 2009)).
43
Id. at 2, 5.
44
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1926 (2011). The Eighth Amendment protects citizens
from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Plaintiffs in Plata argued that the
State violated their Eighth Amendment rights by denying access to health care and adequate
protection in prisons.
45
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
46
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1927.
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appointed a receiver, who, over the following three years, monitored the
prison medical system.50
Finally, by 2007, the Brown and Coleman cases were combined and
brought before a three-judge district court convened by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.51 Throughout two weeks in 2009, the
three-judge court heard alarming testimony about the status of the prison
medical system.52 In the end, the court found that overcrowding resulted
in strained medical and mental health facilities, over-burdened staff, and
violent and unsanitary conditions:53 “Until the problem of overcrowding
is overcome,” the court concluded, “it will be impossible to provide
constitutionally compliant care to California’s prison population.”54 The
court ordered the State to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of
design-capacity within two years.55 The State appealed, and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.56
In May 2011, the Supreme Court upheld the three-judge district
court’s ruling that population reduction provided the only remedy to the
Eighth Amendment violations.57 It affirmed the order that the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) reduce its prison
population to 137.5% of the prison system’s design capacity—a
reduction of about 33,000 prisoners—by 2013.58 Other potential
solutions, such as hiring new staff, transferring prisoners to other states
or building new facilities, were ruled out as impossible, given the State’s
resources.59
C. LEGISLATIVE ACTION DURING THE PLATA LITIGATION—A
PRECURSOR TO A.B. 109
During the three-judge district court’s proceedings, California
passed S.B. 678 in an effort to reduce the flow of felony probationers to
state prison.60 Much like the California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965,
50

Id.
Id. at 1927-28. The convening of a three-judge panel was required under the federal
Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3) (Westlaw 2013).
52
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1927–28.
53
Id. at 1932.
54
Id.
55
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 THE, 2010 WL
99000, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010); see Schlanger, supra note 15, at 180.
56
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1930.
57
Id. at 1947.
58
Id. at 1945, 1947.
59
Id. at 1937-39.
60
S.B. 678, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
51
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S.B. 678 provides incentive funding to counties that keep probationers
from being sent to prison.61 “Top-tier counties”—those that reduce the
number of people they send to prison by more than 50% of an
established baseline—receive higher funding awards.62 The California
Administrative Office of the Courts oversees county progress.63 Funding
began in December 2010,64 and the federal Edward Byrne Memorial
Justice Assistance Grant program, provided through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, seeded an initial funding pot of
$45 million to be distributed among the fifty-eight counties.65
Under S.B. 678, counties are required to spend their incentive funds
to create community corrections practices and programs for adult felony
probationers.66 Counties began to develop risks-and-needs assessments
to determine the levels of supervision probationers required, and to
create alternatives to incarceration such as electronic monitoring and
evidence-based programs for rehabilitation services.67 Some counties
also hired additional probation officers and created assessment strategies
for probationers and pilot programs to expand evidence-based services.68
In 2010, counties saw the rate of probation failures drop from 7.9%
to 6.1%.69 That year, the counties diverted an average daily population
of 6,000 felony probationers from going to prison, with no major impact
on local crime, saving the State $179 million in reduced prison
incarceration costs.70 These savings were used in part to fund the
counties for the following year (fiscal year 2011-2012), dividing $87.5
million among the counties.71 In 2011, again, probation failures dropped:
probation departments diverted an estimated 9,500 people from state
prison, and the rate of probation failure fell to 5.4%.72 The rate
61

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB678 YEAR 1 REPORT, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE ACT 2 (June 8, 2011), available
at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SB678-Year-1-Report-FINAL.pdf.
62
Id. County annual probation revocation rates are compared to a baseline established by
overall county averages from 2006 to 2008.
63
Warren, supra note 21, at 189.
64
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61.
65
Id.
66
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3) (Westlaw 2013).
67
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3)(A)–(D) (Westlaw 2013).
68
Feinstein, supra note 38, at 406-07.
69
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 3.
70
Id.
71
Id.; see also VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE FUNDING
INITIATIVES, available at www.vera.org/files/pif-implementation-chart.pdf.
72
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB 678 YEAR 2 REPORT, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT OF 2009, at 2 (July 2012),
available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SB678-Year-2-report.pdf.
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continued to decline in 2012, and that year the State distributed $136.3
million to probation departments after it saved an estimated $536.6
million over three years due to the reduction in probationers being sent to
state prison.73 The Department of Finance calculated incentive grants by
multiplying the number of prisoners the counties were able to divert from
prison by about $36,000—the average amount the State spent that year
incarcerating and supervising each person who had his or her probation
revoked.74
D. AB 109: THE PRISON REALIGNMENT ACT OF 2011
As the Supreme Court deliberated Brown v. Plata, California began
preparing for a decision that would require rapid reduction in its prison
population.75 While S.B. 678 was successful, it was not having the
immediate effect on the prison population necessary for the State to meet
the lower court’s decree that was under review by the Supreme Court.76
By January 2011, Governor Brown had produced a draft of A.B. 109,77
and counties began to hear whispers of what was to come: the transfer of
thousands of state prisoners to county control.78
One of realignment’s most dramatic features is that it requires
people sentenced with low-level felonies to be held in county jails rather
than state prisons.79 This means that jails see an increase of people
serving longer sentences for more significant crimes.80 In addition to an
increase in new felony offenders, jails also now hold many state parolees
73

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., REPORT ON THE
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT OF 2009, FINDINGS FROM
THE S.B. 678 PROGRAM 14 (Apr. 2013), available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/lr-SB-678April-2013.pdf.
74
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 2.
75
Schlanger, supra note 15, at 184.
76
In 2011 under S.B. 678, an average daily population of approximately 9,500 people were
diverted from going to prison. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 73, at 12 n.35. While
impressive, this was not reducing the prison population was dramatically as necessary.
77
See generally LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, GOVERNOR’S REALIGNMENT PLAN—
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Jan. 25, 2011), available at www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2011/CJ_
Realignment_Plan_01_25_11.pdf.
78
See, e.g., Editorial, Get Ready, California, Here Come the Inmates, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2011, available at articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/30/realestate/la-ed-re-entry-20110830.
79
Felons who will be placed into county custody are those who are non-violent, non-serious,
and non-sex offenders (also known as “the three nons”), based on the crimes that they have
committed, as defined by the Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h) (Westlaw 2013); see also
KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 2.
80
A “felony is a crime that is punishable with death, by imprisonment in the state prison, or
notwithstanding any other provision of law, by imprisonment in a county jail under the provisions of
subdivision (h) of [Penal Code] Section 1170.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (Westlaw 2013).
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who violated the terms of their release.81 Prior to realignment, people on
state parole who violated the terms of their release, such as by failing to
report to a parole officer, would be sent back to prison.82 People on
parole who committed new crimes would also be sent back to prison.83
Now, most of these people, with few exceptions, are sent to county jail.84
This has increased jail populations in some counties by hundreds of
offenders per month.85 In order to manage this increasing population,
realignment urges counties to use alternatives to incarceration such as
flash incarceration, split sentences, electronic monitoring, and home
detention.86 Sheriffs’ departments and sentencing judges have discretion
as to whether low-level felons convicted in county court will be put in
jail or released into mandatory supervision through split sentencing,87
which can include alternative sanctions such as work release or
electronic monitoring.88 Felons who remain under state parole return to
the county of their last residence continuing to report to state officials
and to utilize state funding.89
Another major impact of A.B. 109 is that many state inmates who
would have been released on parole under the supervision of state-funded
parole officers and programming, are now released into a new countyrun system called “Post-Release Community Supervision” (PRCS).90
81

State parolees supervised by either county or state agents will be sent to jail for parole
revocations, except for individuals who were released from prison after serving indeterminate life
sentences. TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 8.
82
In 2010, the total number of adult prison parolees who returned to prison because of
violating their release terms was 77,510. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., RATE OF FELON PAROLEES
RETURNED TO CALIFORNIA PRISONS CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 1 tbl.1 (Mar. 2011), available at
www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services_branch/Annual/PVRET2/PVRET
2d2010.pdf.
83
Id. In 2010, the total number of adult prison parolees who returned to prison because they
were convicted of new crimes while on parole was 17,193.
84
These parolees will serve a revocation period of up to 180 days in county jail but will
return to state parole or prison if they have remaining parole time. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.08
(Westlaw 2013).
85
See Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION,
www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/index.html, for the most updated information on how many people are
being transferred from state to county control.
86
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3454(b)-(c) (Westlaw 2012). Split sentencing enables a judge to
sentence a felon to both jail and community supervision. Flash incarceration is a brief sentence in
jail of up to ten days, used for felons who violate the terms of their community supervision.
TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 60.
87
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(B) (Westlaw 2012).
88
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016(a) (Westlaw 2012).
89
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.08 (Westlaw 2013).
90
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3451(a) (Westlaw 2013) (state inmates shall “upon release from
prison and for a period not exceeding three years immediately following release, be subject to
community supervision provided by a county agency designated by each county’s board of
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Specifically, any state prisoner who committed a low-level crime will be
released into county control instead of being monitored by the State.91
Every offender eligible for PRCS must enter into a PRCS agreement as a
condition of his or her release from prison.92 Each county’s PRCS
system is in charge of supervising and providing rehabilitative
programming.93 Adult probation departments are now authorized to
connect this population with housing, rehabilitation, and training
services.94 Altogether, realignment envisions a dramatic transformation
in how probation departments handle their populations.95
Realignment initially provided approximately $450 million to be
divided among the counties in fiscal year 2011-12 to implement
realignment strategies.96 In fiscal year 2012-2013, this increased to $850
million, and for fiscal year 2013-2014 the State allocated more than $1
billion to the counties.97 Proposition 30, which voters passed in
November 2012, increased income and sales taxes, in part to guarantee
funding for realignment.98

supervisors which is consistent with evidence-based practices, including, but not limited to,
supervision policies, procedures, programs, and practices demonstrated by scientific research to
reduce recidivism among individuals under postrelease supervision.”).
91
This group will not include anyone in state prison currently serving a term for a violent
offense, who has committed a third strike pursuant to California’s “Three Strikes, You’re Out” law,
or who is considered a Mentally Disordered Offender. See KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 3.
Note, however, that this threshold only takes into account the offender’s most recent crime. An
offender who committed a violent crime in the past and, for example, is back in prison due to a
technical violation of parole will still be considered eligible for PRCS. A PRCS offender is eligible
for discharge at six months.
92
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3452 (Westlaw 2012).
93
KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6, at 3.
94
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8) (Westlaw 2012).
95
To be clear, the reentry services that are discussed in this Comment should be offered to
both the PRCS population and those “three non” felons who are now released into mandatory
supervision under A.B. 109.
96
Some counties criticized A.B. 109 for what they call a fiscally penalizing policy of
awarding less realignment funding to counties that have fewer people in state prison. Counties
received more money if the State estimated that more parolees would be returned to them.
Therefore, counties that had already succeeded in diverting people from prison (and were therefore
most likely already getting more S.B. 678 funding), or that had lower crime rates, received less startup funding for A.B. 109. This funding rubric has since been revised. Petersilia & Snyder, supra note
20, at 272-73.
97
Funding of Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, available at
www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/Funding-Realignment.html (last visited May 22, 2013).
98
Petersilia & Snyder, supra note 20, at 8-9.
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II. AB 109 AND PLATA CALL ON COUNTIES TO VASTLY ALTER THE
ROLE OF PROBATION, TO SLOW RECIDIVISM, AND TO IMPROVE
REHABILITATION
Both realignment measures and Plata call on counties to focus on
recidivism, so much so that many officials have come away with the
impression that reentry and rehabilitation services are necessary for
realignment’s success. For example, in a memo to counties, Paul
McIntosh, Executive Director of the California State Association of
Counties, stated: “Clearly the successful implementation of realignment
will require a significant paradigm shift in our public safety
communities. The successful model will not be an incarceration model,
but one that seeks to divert and rehabilitate citizens, returning them to be
productive members of our community.”99 This impression stems from
explicit language about rehabilitation and reentry programs in
realignment’s legislative language, as well as from the Supreme Court’s
discussion in Brown v. Plata.100 Indeed, both the Supreme Court and the
state legislation highlight holistic remedies to prison population
reduction that focus more on the means—systemic reform of probation—
than on the ends.101
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S BROAD REMEDY INCLUDED REDUCING
RECIDIVISM THROUGH REENTRY SERVICES
The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for California to refocus its
corrections system on reducing recidivism through rehabilitation. The
opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, observed that the State’s
prison system as a whole is troubled, going so far as to say that all
incarcerated persons are the system’s “next potential victims.”102 In
assigning a remedy as broad as reducing the population of the State’s
prison system, the Court created an order that will impact all prisoners in
California who “are at risk so long as the State continues to provide
inadequate care.”103 Not only did the Court conclude that reducing
99

Memorandum from Paul McIntosh, Exec. Dir., Cal. State Ass’n of Counties, to County
Supervisors and County Administrative Officers (July 12, 2011).
100
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4)-(5) (Westlaw 2012); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct.
1910, 1943 (2011).
101
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4)-(5) (Westlaw 2012).
102
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1940. In fact, as the Court acknowledged, reducing the prison
population does not directly relate to creating a better care system for offenders. The reasoning
behind the remedy hinges on the assumption that prison officials will provide better care if there are
fewer prisoners. Id.
103
Id.
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overcrowding was a narrow enough remedy to pass constitutional
muster,104 but it also celebrated the option as a means of addressing other
systemic problems: “Reducing overcrowding will also have positive
effects beyond facilitating timely and adequate access to medical care,
including reducing the incidence of prison violence and ameliorating
unsafe living conditions.”105
After establishing that a population reduction was the only option
for the State, and that the remedy could affect the prison population in its
entirety, Justice Kennedy elaborated on the alternative remedies that
would reduce the population of prisoners without impacting public
safety.106 Under the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act, a court must
give substantial weight to public safety concerns when considering
population reduction orders.107 The district court accepted the plaintiffs’
argument that the State could reduce its prison population while
maintaining public safety through such means as using community
correctional programs and rehabilitative programming, and the Supreme
Court accepted these findings as fact.108 Justice Kennedy took note of
the incarceration alternatives the district court had discussed, specifically
that the State could employ methods such as “[d]iverting low-risk
offenders to community programs such as drug treatment, day reporting
centers, and electronic monitoring,” as well as “punishing technical
parole violations through community-based programs.”109
This language demonstrates the Supreme Court’s recognition that
California needs to utilize alternatives to incarceration, including
community-based programming, in order for a population reduction
order to be safe and feasible. Had the Court’s remedy mandated
reducing the population of prisons without addressing the underlying
causes of overpopulation, it would have appeared both unrealistic and
flippant—a call to release thousands of prisoners without a system to
help them reenter mainstream society. However, the Court made
alternatives to incarceration a component of its remedy by recognizing

104

Id. at 1929.
Id. at 1939.
106
Id. at 1942-43.
107
18 U.S.C.A § 3626(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2013).
108
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (J. Scalia, dissenting). Justice Scalia took particular issue
with this in his dissent.
109
Id. at 1943 (majority opinion). Specifically, the Court stated that the “State now sends
large numbers of persons to prison for violating a technical term or condition of their parole, and it
could reduce the prison population by punishing technical parole violations through communitybased programs. This last measure would be particularly beneficial as it would reduce crowding in
the reception centers, which are especially hard hit by overcrowding.” Id.
105
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that without such measures, its mandate could lead to a public safety
risk.110
B. REALIGNMENT’S FOCUS ON REHABILITATION’S ROLE IN ENDING
RECIDIVISM
Realignment expanded on the Court’s concept of creating holistic
and wide-ranging solutions. The language of A.B. 109’s modifying bill,
A.B. 117, focuses on ending recidivism largely through communitybased corrections programs.111 The legislation explicitly declares that
California “must reinvest its criminal justice resources to support
community-based corrections programs and evidence-based practices” in
order to best address public safety issues.112
A.B. 117 seeks to mitigate public safety risks by tasking counties
with creating programs that facilitate low-level felony offenders’
“reintegration back into society.”113 The legislation states that funding
may be utilized to provide more intensive probation supervision and
expand the availability of evidence-based rehabilitation programs
“including, but not limited to, drug and alcohol treatment, mental health
treatment, anger management, cognitive behavior programs, and job
training and employment services”114 and “evaluating the effectiveness
of rehabilitation and supervision programs and ensuring program
fidelity.”115 It includes several suggestions for more holistic treatment
strategies, such as community-based residential programs that offer drug
and alcohol treatment, literacy training, employment counseling, and
mental health treatment. It also provides explicit examples of programs
such as mother-infant care programs and day reporting centers.116
By strongly encouraging counties to apply recidivism-reducing
practices to the PRCS population that encompass “a range of custodial
and noncustodial responses to criminal or noncompliant offender

110

Id.
A.B. 117, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011-2012), amending CAL. PENAL CODE §
17.5 (Westlaw 2012).
112
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4) (Westlaw 2012).
113
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5) (Westlaw 2012) (“Realigning low-level felony offenders
who do not have prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex offenses to locally run communitybased corrections programs, which are strengthened through community-based punishment,
evidence-based practices, improved supervision strategies, and enhanced secured capacity, will
improve public safety outcomes among adult felons and facilitate their reintegration back into
society.”).
114
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3)(D) (Westlaw 2012).
115
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3)(E) (Westlaw 2012).
116
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8)(H)-(K) (Westlaw 2012).
111
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activity,”117 the Legislature has demonstrated that it expects counties to
manage their PRCS populations—as well as the large population that
courts will be sentencing to probation instead of prison—in a way that
both stems the flow of people back into jails and addresses public safety
issues. Otherwise, the county jails will suffer the same fate as the State’s
prisons: overpopulation and the potential violation of inmates’ rights.118
III. WITHOUT REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTIES’ REHABILITATION
EFFORTS, COUNTIES WILL NOT ESTABLISH THE TYPE OF PROBATION
SERVICES NEEDED TO FULFILL THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATION
AND THE SUPREME COURT
By relying on counties to develop post-release rehabilitation
systems for those on mandatory supervision or in PRCS without
specifying funding and program-development requirements, realignment
sets up a system destined to fail. Without legislative mandates regarding
what types of programs, if any, to provide, counties are responding to
realignment in very different ways, with many choosing to forgo
investing in substantial reentry services, which, as will be demonstrated
below, are a primary tool in reducing recidivism.119
A. REALIGNMENT PROVIDES MINIMAL GUIDANCE FOR HOW COUNTIES
SHOULD FACILITATE REENTRY AND REHABILITATION SERVICES,
WHICH ARE VITAL TO REDUCING RECIDIVISM
The State provided minimal specifications for how counties should
spend funding apportionments.120 These specifications came in two
forms: specific funding accounts earmarked for particular entities, and a
list of suggested programs counties could incorporate into their probation
departments.121 The initial funding for counties’ first year of realignment
117

CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8) (Westlaw 2012).
Jails are already grappling with overcrowding. The Prison Law Office recently filed a suit
against Fresno County for failing to provide mental health care to prisoners. Additionally, many
jails are under court-enforced population caps. See Schlanger, supra note 15, at 212-213 for a
thorough discussion of realignment’s impact on jail populations. See also MISCZYNSKI, supra note
4, at 13 (“[C]ounties are clearly not in a position to both incarcerate all of the inmates they managed
prior to realignment and all of the realigned offenders.”).
119
See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 9-10.
120
See id. for a breakdown of the total realignment package.
121
See, e.g., EXEC. COMM. OF THE SANTA CRUZ CNTY. CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP, SANTA CRUZ
COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND POST RELEASE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 2011
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 6 (Oct. 4, 2011), available at www.calrealignment.org/component/
docman/doc_download/69-santa-cruz-county-plan.html?Itemid, for an example of how counties
received their initial state funding allotment.
118
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was distributed by the State in four separate accounts.122 One funding
stream was allocated for purposes that included increasing the number of
jail beds, hiring additional jail security, creating alternatives to
incarceration, such as increased use of electronic monitoring supplies and
probation officers, and channeling more resources into existing and new
rehabilitation programs.123 The three other streams of funding were
reserved for the district attorney and public defenders’ offices, one-time
start-up costs, and planning grants.124 Therefore, while the State
indicated to counties that some funds were indeed intended to go toward
rehabilitative and reentry services, it did not specify a particular spending
rubric, and thus counties could elect to spend the majority of PRCS
program funds on augmenting their incarceration facilities.125
Reentry and rehabilitative programs have proven to be highly
effective tools for reducing recidivism. The Legislative Analyst’s Office
(LAO) highlighted that in order to minimize recidivism and reduce
crime, offenders require treatment and assistance programs “such as drug
treatment, mental health counseling, employment assistance and anger
management.”126 Research has shown that offenders in community
supervision are more likely to be successful while on probation if they
are provided effective, evidence-based127 treatment and assistance
programs (i.e., those that are continually monitored and have a proven
record of success).128
Not only are these programs better for

122

Id.
Id.
124
Memorandum from Paul McIntosh, CSAC Exec. Dir., on Allocation/Caseload Information
on AB 109/AB117 (Criminal Justice Realignment), to Chairs, Cnty. Bds. of Supervisors, Cnty.
Admin. Officers 1 (July 8, 2011), available at www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/
committees/forensics/1107_forensics/csac_memo_re_allocation-caseload_info_on_ab_109_(7-811).pdf.
125
Id.
126
See generally LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12.
127
One study found that “[t]he implementation of evidence-based practices results in an
average decrease in future crime of between 10 percent and 20 percent, whereas programs that are
not evidence-based tend to see no decrease and even a slight increase in future crime. Interventions
that follow all evidence-based practices can achieve recidivism reductions of 30 percent. Many state
statutes and administrative regulations specify that certain correctional services and programs must
be evidence-based.” PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, POLICY
FRAMEWORK TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS ch. 1, at 6 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/PolicyFra
mework.pdf (footnotes omitted).
128
JOHN ROMAN & AARON CHALFIN, JUSTICE POLICY CTR., DOES IT PAY TO INVEST IN
REENTRY PROGRAMS FOR JAIL INMATES? 1 (June 2006), available at www.urban.org/
projects/reentry-roundtable/upload/roman_chalfin.pdf (finding “that reentry programs for jail-based
inmates produce benefits large enough to offset the cost of the investment with only a modest
reduction in crime”). In an effort to contain the scope of this Comment, data and studies on the vast
123
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probationers, but they can also be less expensive than incarceration.129
Moreover, better probation practices can improve public safety by
providing people exiting jail with opportunities and healing that decrease
their motivation to commit future crimes.130
Realignment modifies the Penal Code to provide suggestions for
PRCS programs but does not go so far as to make any specific
components of rehabilitation efforts by counties mandatory.131 Instead, it
only suggests rehabilitation and reentry programming possibilities.132
For example, A.B. 117 merely suggests that the community-based
punishment (which includes reentry services) “may be provided by local
public safety entities directly or through community-based public or
private correctional service providers.”133
A.B. 117 modifies another section of the Penal Code to mandate
that funds “shall be used to provide supervision and rehabilitative
services for adult felony offenders subject to probation, and shall be
spent on evidence-based community corrections practices and
programs.”134 While the use of “shall” indicates that counties are
required to spend at least some funding on community programs, the
legislation then states that the programs “may” include expanding
evidence-based risk and needs assessments, electronic monitoring,
mandatory community service, home detention, day reporting, restorative
justice programs, work furlough programs, and incarceration in county
jail for up to ninety days.135 The Legislature left out any additional
guidance that would guarantee that counties focus more on treatment
than on monitoring. The reentry services that A.B. 117 lists—such as
job training programs, employment services, and alcohol treatment—are
all purely suggestive, and the law does not provide counties with

benefit of rehabilitative and reentry programs for people exiting incarceration will be omitted. For
further reading on this issue, see Joan Petersilia, What Works in Prisoner Reentry—Reviewing and
Questioning the Evidence, 68 FED. PROBATION 4 (2004), and JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME
BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005).
129
Petersilia, supra note 128, at 7.
130
BILL ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, SB 678 2 (June 16, 2009), available
at
www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_678_cfa_20090619_104915_asm_co
mm.html. A.B. 117 states that public safety will be improved by “[r]ealigning low-level felony
offenders who do not have prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex offenses to locally run
community-based corrections programs,” essentially by better facilitating an incarcerated person’s
“reintegration back into society.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5) (Westlaw 2012).
131
See generally KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6.
132
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(8) (Westlaw 2012).
133
Id. (emphasis added).
134
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3) (Westlaw 2012) (emphasis added).
135
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3)(A)-(B) (Westlaw 2012).
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minimal requirements, performance measurements, or accountability
models to ensure these techniques are being implemented properly.136
Much like as in the California Probation Subsidy Act of 1965 and
S.B. 678, none of these suggested programming efforts are enforceable
requirements.137 But realignment goes further than previous legislation
by making mandatory sentencing changes and forcing counties to take on
new offenders and to create a new probationary system.138 S.B. 678
required funds to be spent on community practices and programs, but it
did not mandate that counties keep felons in their control. A.B. 109, on
the other hand, mandates that counties retain a large portion of felons,
but it does not put detailed requirements on how counties spend their
funds. While the previous legislations used the “carrot” of funding
incentives to encourage counties to participate in programming,
realignment only provides a “stick,” with dangerous ramifications if
counties are unsuccessful at keeping PRCS and probation populations
from returning to jail.
B. MANY COUNTIES’ PROBATIONARY SYSTEMS LACK THE
INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE MOTIVATION NEEDED TO CREATE THE
NECESSARY REHABILITATIVE SERVICES
California has some of the worst probation failure rates in the
country—probationers are 10% less likely than the national average to
successfully complete their probationary periods.139 In 2007, prior to any
of the current probation reform acts, around 20,000 of the nearly 47,000
new admissions to state prison were felony offenders who were
committed to state prison after failing probation supervision.140 Some
counties return probationers to prison at a rate as high as 12% to 16%.141
In part, this is an effort to relieve strapped probation departments: a study
by the LAO showed that probation officers frequently recommend that
repeat probation violators be sent to prison because probation
departments “often lack sufficient resources to properly supervise and

136

For a discussion of performance measurements and accountability recommendations, see
TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 16-17.
137
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(3) (Westlaw 2012).
138
See generally KEY PROVISIONS, supra note 6.
139
Warren, supra note 21, at 187.
140
BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 130.
141
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12, at 30-31.
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treat” repeat offenders.142 The study found that “[t]he consequence of
these fiscal incentives is that some offenders who could be safely and
successfully supervised at the local level . . . are instead sent to state
prison at an even greater cost to taxpayers.”143 Essentially, counties pass
the buck to the State by sending people to prison.144
Realignment sought to end this cycle of recidivism by decreasing
parole violations and repeat offenses through better reentry systems.145
However, the lack of existing infrastructure and political will has meant
that many counties do not have substantial reentry systems already in
place.146 Moreover, a look at county realignment plans demonstrates that
counties often do not have the motivation to use realignment funding in a
way that will establish these services. While some counties have focused
efforts on programs to reduce probation failure rates, other counties have
focused primarily on incarceration.147
1. Many Communities and Probation Departments Lack the
Infrastructure and Political Will To Create the Necessary Reentry
Systems
Probation departments have long lacked the resources needed to
create significant reentry systems.148 Only 3,000 sworn probation
officers monitor the estimated 330,000 adult probationers statewide.149
Each probation officer oversees between one hundred and two hundred
cases a month.150 Two propositions in the 1970s severely limited

142

Id. at 19. The LAO estimated that about 3,000 probation officers in the state manage 100200 cases each, which entails ensuring that probationers meet the terms of the release and often
involves referring probationers to service programs. See generally id. at 3, 8-9.
143
Id. at 19.
144
Id. at 20; see also Feinstein, supra note 38, at 377 (“This dearth of funds for adult
probation and the inadequate supervision and resources creates an incentive structure adverse to
keeping probationers in the community. Probation officers are incentivized to recommend
incarceration rather than probation since the state must then bear the financial burden of that
offender; moreover, sending a probationer to prison is one less case for their already overburdened
loads. Judges are incentivized to revoke probation and sentence someone to state prison for the
same reason.”).
145
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(1)-(8) (Westlaw 2012).
146
See generally Warren, supra note 21.
147
See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 9-10.
148
See generally Warren, supra note 21.
149
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12, at 20; PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE
IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA’S PROBATION PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE FUNDING PROGRAM 1 (Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_
corrections/Pew_California_probation_brief.pdf.
150
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12, at 10.
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counties’ tax revenues, and since then “adult probation services in
California have been woefully underfunded.”151 Even with S.B. 678
funding, many county probation departments struggle to provide
rehabilitative programming to their pre-realignment populations.152
Moreover, the idea that probation should provide rehabilitative
services came back into vogue only recently.153 While the concept of
reforming people convicted of crimes was popular in the era of the
Probation Subsidy Act of 1965, by the 1980s and 1990s, the focus of
probation turned to punishment.154 A 1995 study found that only 8% of
probation departments in the state prioritized rehabilitation and social
reintegration, whereas 75% of the departments prioritized enforcing the
terms of probation.155 More recently, the LAO conducted a study of
thirty-one counties and found that probation departments often do not
make programming available that is proven to help people on probation
succeed in mainstream society post-conviction and incarceration.156 The
survey found that while some programs, such as substance abuse
treatment and mental illness programs, were ubiquitous, other programs,
such as those regarding education, housing, and vocational training, were
offered only rarely.157 Even in counties that have programs already
available, other factors, such as limited capacity and low quality, kept
many probationers from participating.158
Communities are often reluctant to support reentry programs,159 and
already some localities have attempted to put the brakes on probation
departments’ plans to increase community programming or to build new
day centers for PRCS populations. In San Bernardino County, the
Probation Department is hoping to build a second Day Reporting Center
151

See, e.g., Warren, supra note 21, at 186 (“Due to the absence of state funding, as well as
the devastating impact of Propositions 4 and 13, adult probation services in California have been
woefully underfunded for at least thirty years.”).
152
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 73, at 29; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS & CAL. STATE ASS’N OF COUNTIES, PROBATION SERVICES TASK. FORCE FINAL REPORT 1
(2003), available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fullReport.pdf.
153
Warren, supra note 21, at 188.
154
Id. at 187.
155
NIETO, supra note 5, at 18-19.
156
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 12, at 19.
157
Id. at 17.
158
Id.
159
See, e.g., Megan Kurlychek, What Is My Left Hand Doing? The Need for Unifying
Purpose and Policy in the Criminal Justice System, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 909, 914
(2011). In analyzing Montana’s early release program, Kurlychek notes that “[f]ear of the offender
is transformed from fiction into fact through the enactment of policies that serve to ‘protect’ the
public by restricting opportunities for those with a criminal record. Restrictions range from housing
and employment to qualifying for student loans and even the right to vote.” Id.
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in the city of Victorville to provide its PRCS population with services.160
The Victorville Planning Commission rejected these plans, on the ground
that it did not want probationers to be brought into the downtown area.161
The Commission’s report said the center would continue the expansion
of “less desirable social services in [the] vicinity of the Civic Center.”162
The county Probation Department said that without the facility, several
hundred of its PRCS members would not get rehabilitation or reentry
services.163 The City Council upheld the Planning Commission’s
decision by a three-to-one vote.164
The barriers to developing better reentry programs are well
illustrated by the difficulty in supplying housing to probationers. An
estimated 10% of parolees are homeless, with the number rising to
between 30% and 50% in cities like San Francisco and Los Angeles.165
Studies show that a formerly incarcerated person who is released into a
homeless shelter is 7% more likely to abscond from parole after his or
her first month out than a person who has stable housing.166 With
housing such as shelters, temporary housing, and permanent supportive
housing already at capacity, counties have limited resources to house this
new population, and there is little political will to build more housing for
a relatively unsympathetic group—the probationers.167 In San Joaquin
County, for instance, 20% of PRCS members were estimated to be
While the county’s plan
returning to the county homeless.168
acknowledged this, it devoted no funding to the creation of new stable
160

Beatriz E. Valenzuela, City, County Butt Heads over Expanding Probation Services,
DAILY PRESS, Feb. 18, 2012, available at http://www.vvdailypress.com/articles/city-32947victorville-county.html.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Beatriz E. Valenzuela, Victorville Denies Probation Expansion Appeal, DAILY PRESS,
Apr. 4, 2012, available at http://www.vvdailypress.com/articles/victorville-33780-probationappeal.html.
165
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, HOMELESSNESS AND PRISONER RE-ENTRY, available at
www.reentrypolicy.org/jc_publications/homelessness_prisoner_reentry/Homelessness.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2013).
166
MARTA NELSON, PERRY DEESS & CHARLOTTE ALLEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FIRST
MONTH OUT: POST-INCARCERATION EXPERIENCES IN NEW YORK CITY 9 (Sept. 1999), available at
www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/first_month_out.pdf.
167
See generally THE FORTUNE SOC’Y, IN OUR BACKYARD: OVERCOMING COMMUNITY
RESISTANCE TO REENTRY HOUSING (A NIMBY TOOLKIT) (2011), available at
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/TOOL_KIT_1-NIMBY_FINAL.pdf (discussing the difficulty of
implementing reentry housing because of neighborhood opposition).
168
SAN JOAQUIN CNTY. EXEC. COMM. OF THE CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP, SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY
PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 39 (Aug. 17, 2011), available at
www.calrealignment.org/county-implementation/list-of-county-plans.html.
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housing.169 Many counties did not plan to fund any reentry housing and
instead allocated much of their state funding from the State to the
sheriffs’ departments to increase the number of jail beds.170 Indeed, the
ACLU found that the largest twenty-five counties in the state had spent
more than $45 million on expanding jail capacity.171
Without additional funding for increasing these services in the
community, these programs will not be able to meet the responsibility of
providing for the new PRCS population or to keep this population from
recommitting crimes and returning to prison. Forcing counties to spend
realignment funding on these programs is the only way to guarantee that
these services will be available to the PRCS and probation populations.
2. Initial Realignment Plans Demonstrate that Probation Departments
Are Not Implementing Sufficient Reentry Programming
There is tremendous disparity in how counties have allocated their
realignment funding and efforts.172 A look at the initial realignment
plans created by counties demonstrates how counties have differed in
their responses to the minimal requirements of the new PRCS system,
with many focusing on jail expansion instead of providing services.173
For a positive example, in the first year of realignment San
Francisco County received 411 prisoners into its PRCS population, and
sentenced 178 people to jail who otherwise would have been sent to
prison.174 The county has long been progressive in its probation
strategies.175 It established a Reentry Council in 2005, which initiated
169

Id.
HOPPER ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
171
Id., The ACLU concluded that “[c]ounties have chosen a path of jail expansion,” finding
that twenty-five of the state’s largest counties are expanding jail capacity by more than 7000 beds, as
well as expanding corrections staff.
172
See CALREALIGNMENT.ORG for access to the majority of county plans. See also CURB
Realignment Report Card—Second Edition, CALIFORNIANS UNITED FOR A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET,
www.curbprisonspending.org/?p=1391#_edn30 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). Californians United for
a Responsible Budget (CURB), a coalition of forty organizations, created its own county report card
on how counties are utilizing alternatives to incarceration. The report card compares the amount of
funding counties are spending on community-based reentry services to the amount that counties are
spending on new jail beds (primarily through state funding from A.B. 900, which authorized $7.4
billion in lease revenue bonds to be used for the expansion of prison, reentry centers and jails). See
id.
173
See CALREALIGNMENT.ORG for access to the majority of county plans.
174
CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP EXEC. COMM., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT IN SAN FRANCISCO:
THE FIRST 12 MONTHS 8 (Dec. 19, 2012), available at www.sfsheriffs.net/files/SF_PSR.pdf.
175
In fact, this is one reason why San Francisco County has seen fewer people entering into
its PRCS system. Since its existing prison deterrent systems were developed prior to realignment,
the County had fewer people in state prison than other counties of similar size. It was already a top170

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss3/7

24

Flynn: Putting Teeth into A.B. 109

2013]

Putting Teeth into A.B. 109

549

efforts to bring probationers together with local community programs as
well as to create new programs to help probationers enter into the
mainstream.176 San Francisco’s initial realignment plan focused on
creating a network of positions in the county justice system to help
coordinate and connect the PRCS and probation population, including
augmenting the county’s Reentry Unit in its Public Defender’s Office,
which is in charge of connecting probationers with services in the
community.177 It also called for creating a “Reentry Division and PreRelease Team”178 to create alternative custody options and for
establishing a “Care Coordination” entity to assist probationers in
navigating the county healthcare systems.179 The plan highlighted the
need to create stable housing, employment help and treatment for those
exiting incarceration.180
Santa Cruz County provides another example of a plan rich with
rehabilitation and reentry strategies. Its thirty-three-page plan spent
considerable space explaining its emphasis on creating and using
evidence-based practices, and on how to continue funding its dozen
existing reentry programs.181 The plan explained that its “[f]our key
values” include “improving public safety by reducing recidivism;
improving accountability to taxpayers by providing cost-effective
solutions; protecting the County from costly legal liability related to jail
overcrowding; and reducing structural inequalities based on race and
poverty.”182 Despite the fact that Santa Cruz County jails were at 125%
capacity when realignment began,183 it dedicated the entirety of its
PRCS/incarceration funds to creating a strong probation department,
with no funds put toward building new jail beds.184 In the first six

tier county under S.B. 678, in recognition of its success in retaining offenders within its local system.
EXEC. COMM. OF THE CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP, CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC SAFETY
REALIGNMENT & POST RELEASE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 7 (July
21, 2011), available at www.sfgov3.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=1035.
176
Id. at 5.
177
Id. at 16 (“Collaborative case planning is the focal point of this active engagement
approach involving the offender, his/her family, probation officer, law enforcement and multiple
service providers (e.g. housing, employment, vocational training, education, physical health,
nutritional supports, behavioral health, and pro-social activities).”).
178
Id. at 17-18.
179
Id. at 20.
180
Id. at 15.
181
EXEC. COMM. OF THE SANTA CRUZ CNTY. CMTY. CORR. P’SHIP, supra note 121.
182
Id. at 15.
183
Id. at 26.
184
Id. at 15.
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months of realignment, Santa Cruz County saw a 20% decrease in its jail
population.185
Other counties were more circumspect about their reentry programs.
Many counties with smaller populations created essentially boilerplate
plans that contained only the language suggested by the CDRC and
nothing else. For example, Siskiyou County, which expected to have a
PRCS population of only twenty-three, created a plan that was just seven
pages long and contained little more than a summary of the changes
realignment will make across the state, a list of people who would make
up its Community Corrections Partnership Executive Committee, and a
basic structure for the creation of future plans.186 Napa County, which
also has a small population but expected a 25% increase in its offender
population at the start of realignment, created a ten-page plan similar in
scope.187 Neither Siskiyou County’s nor Napa County’s plan provided
more than a brief nod to reentry programs or recidivism-reducing
strategies.
Meanwhile, some larger county plans were focused more on
increasing their number of jail beds than on augmenting their reentry
systems. Kern County, for example, expected its average daily
population of offenders to increase by about two thousand under
realignment.188 While its lengthy plan discussed the benefits of its
already-existing Day Reporting Center, where probationers can receive
mental health and substance abuse treatment, by far the bulk of the
county’s funding allotment was allocated to ensuring that the PRCS
population will be assessed for risk and well-monitored, and to adding
jail beds to accommodate 236 more people.189

185

CURB Realignment Report Card—Second Edition, supra note 172.
SISKIYOU COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND POST RELEASE COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION PRELIMINARY PLAN (Oct. 11, 2011), available at www.calrealignment.org/
component/docman/doc_download/86-siskiyou-countyplan.html?Itemid.
187
See COUNTY OF NAPA PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND POST RELEASE COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2011), available at www.calrealignment.org/
component/docman/doc_download/74-napa-county-plan.html?Itemid.
188
COUNTY OF KERN PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT ACT OF 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 4
(2011), available at http://www.calrealignment.org/county-implementation/list-of-county-plans.
html.
189
Id. at 11. The variety of structure and scope among these plans in some ways is
understandable in that it reflects the population needs each county is expecting to confront within
this new system. For example, both Riverside and San Joaquin counties dedicate substantial funding
toward their mental health departments, in response to indications that the PRCS populations will be
returning with mental disorders. Some counties need to initially focus on building and training their
probation departments to bring them up to date with current evidence-based practices in reentry
systems.
186
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Riverside County had more than 2,000 people released into its
PRCS population in its first year. Initially, the county received a total of
nearly $23 million in realignment funding from the State for fiscal year
2011-2012, and the county allocated $5.8 million of its realignment
funding to its probation department while giving more than $10 million
to its Sheriff’s Department.190 While the plan mentioned that the county
was interested in building Day Reporting Centers, it provided few
details, while many pages of the plan were devoted to inmate
monitoring.191 The plan allotted $4.2 million of realignment funding to
go toward the county’s Department of Mental Health, and the county
estimated that 80% of its PRCS population would have substance-abuse
issues and 5% would have severe mental-health problems.192 Relative to
San Francisco and Santa Cruz counties, both Kern and Riverside
counties initially focused funding heavily on incarceration.193
The LAO surveyed forty-seven county plans and found that 32% of
funding in most counties went to probation departments, “primarily for
supervision and programs.”194 While this may sound like counties are
taking heed of the need to develop reentry and rehabilitative programs, it
is unclear how much of this funding has actually been spent on reentry
programs. More telling is that the LAO study also found that only 11%
of funding was allocated to programs and services provided by other
agencies in the community, “such as substance abuse and mental health
treatment, housing assistance and employment services.”195 Since most
counties did not have strong probation systems already in place when
realignment began, the fact that so little is being spent on augmenting the
capacity of outside agencies indicates that these resources might not be
available to the current PRCS population.196
190

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT & POST-RELEASE COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION FINAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 43 (Feb. 7, 2012), available at www.probation.co.
riverside.ca.us/pdf/ccpec/Final_Implementation_Plan_February_7_2012.pdf.
191
Id. at 7.
192
CURB Realignment Report Card—Second Edition, supra note 172.
193
Id. CURB found that nine of the thirteen counties it reviewed spent more money on jail
expansion than on alternatives.
194
TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 9-10.
195
Id. at 10.
196
The ACLU’s report has additional data on how little some counties are putting toward
reentry programming:
[T]he Probation Department in Orange County plans to open “several regional adult day
reporting centers, as collaborative and evidence-based one-stop delivery sites” to serve 50
supervisees each, but the plan allocates only nine percent of the programming budget to
contract with service providers, or one-sixth that of the sheriff’s allocation. Kings County’s
plan acknowledges that “live in drug treatment programs will be essential to help reduce
overcrowding in the jail” and that mental health staffing must be increased, but allocates a
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In the last year, even without requirements, many counties have
been allocating more resources to reintegrating inmates than they had
before.197 For example, in March 2013 Riverside County released an
update to its plan.198 For fiscal year 2012-2013, the State awarded
Riverside with more than $43 million, and, combined with additional
funding, the county had $53 million to spend on its realignment
measures.199 While it spent $21 million on the Sheriff’s Department and
just half that on probation, it also allocated $10 million to the county’s
Department of Mental Health to go toward services like substance abuse
programs and housing.200 The updated plan included more detailed
discussion about the rehabilitative needs of the county’s PRCS
population.201 However, making these programs a requirement will give
counties the needed push to put more resources into reentry programs
and cut through resistance in the community and probation department,
and ensure that all counties respond similarly. By creating mandates for
how counties should allocate funding to their PRCS populations, as well
as the populations of people who will be heading into county-sentenced
probation, the Legislature could remedy disparities among counties and
make realignment much more likely to succeed in reducing recidivism.

paltry two percent of its total AB 109 programming budget to health, treatment, and other
services—less than the allocations made to both the Human Resources and the County
Counsel. This is in stark contrast to counties like Alameda, Placer, San Joaquin, Santa Clara,
Shasta, and Solano, which allocate anywhere from a quarter to a third to such programming.
HOPPER ET AL., supra note 10, at 40.
197
Local newspapers regularly come out with stories about how counties are attempting new
programs for their reentry population. For example, both the tiny counties of Glenn County and
Plumas County are now offering education courses to their former inmates, using public and private
funding. See, e.g., Debra Moore, Parolee Reentry Program Gains Momentum, PLUMAS COUNTY
NEWS, Apr. 1, 2013, available at www.plumasnews.com/~plumas6/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=10801:parolee-reentry-program-gains-momentum&catid=69:-headlinenews&Itemid=6.
198
EXEC. COMM. OF THE CMTY CORR. EXEC. P’SHIP., COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PUBLIC SAFETY
REALIGNMENT & POST-RELEASE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN UPDATE (Mar.
12, 2013), available at www.probation.co.riverside.ca.us/pdf/ccpec/County_of_Riverside_
Public_Safety_Realignment_&_PRCS_Implementation_Plan_Update_031213.pdf.
199
Id. at 3.
200
Id. The county is still heavily focused on incarceration. See, e.g., Riverside County To
Receive $100 Million for Jail Expansion, SW. RIVERSIDE NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 8, 2012),
www.swrnn.com/2012/03/08/riverside-county-to-receive-100-million-for-jail-expansion/.
201
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT & POST-RELEASE COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION IMPLEMENTATION FINAL PLAN, supra note 190, at 30-35. The plan discusses the
Probation Department’s partnership with the Mental Health Department, the challenges of
transporting people to services, and the need to build more reentry housing.
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IV. REHABILITATION PROGRAM GUIDELINES SHOULD BE MANDATORY
Reducing the flow to prisons requires more than reducing crime
rates—counties must create probation systems that actually function to
keep people from returning to prison.202 Realignment should modify the
Penal Code to include funding requirements for rehabilitation and reentry
services, to realize the intent of the legislation and to ensure that inmates
have equal access to available rehabilitative services. The Probationary
Subsidy Act of 1965 revealed that counties need more than incentives
based on how much they reduce the prison population—they need their
success to be measured based on compliance with programming proven
to reduce recidivism.203 S.B. 678 responded to this lesson by requiring
counties to spend their funding on evidence-based, recidivism-reducing
programs, yet its progress would have been too slow to meet the Court’s
population-reduction deadline, and therefore stronger policy was
needed.204 While A.B. 109 mandates population reduction in a way that
S.B. 678 did not, since it does not provide reentry program incentives or
mandates, counties may never install the type of programming that will
assist people exiting incarceration. Therefore, the legislation should
contain stronger program guidelines that counties are required to follow.
One reason the State may not have wanted to force counties to
create specific community programming could be the desire to provide
counties with the freedom to respond to the incoming PRCS populations
as they see fit. For example, the LAO suggests that the State should allot
realignment funding in a way that allows this flexibility in programming
creation.205 The LAO states that flexibility allows for local innovation
and responsiveness to local needs.206 California’s counties span the
gamut of income, resources, job availability, education, and probation
populations, and the State has often shown interest in allowing local
governments to tailor programs to their own specific issues.207 However,
allowing the counties to have so much discretion fails to account for the

202

For an overview of this concept, see Ball, supra note 28.
Warren, supra note 21, at 190.
204
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b) (Westlaw 2013).
205
TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 3.
206
Id. at 15.
207
For example, the State gave counties much freedom when it realigned its mental health
system in 1991. CAL. MENTAL HEALTH DIRS. ASS’N, HISTORY AND FUNDING SOURCES OF
CALIFORNIA’S PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (July 20, 2006), available at www.mhac.org/
pdf/CMHDA_History_Mental_Health_Funding.pdf.
203
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possibility that counties will not have the political will or means to
implement these programs.208
One way the Legislature could provide a one-size-fits-all
requirement for counties while still allowing local flexibility and control
would be to incorporate the following language into A.B. 118 (which
provides the specific funding requirements for A.B. 109):
If 10% or more of the PRCS population is returning to the county
homeless (as that word is defined by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development), the county SHALL put forward at least [a
specified percentage range] of its funding designated for probationary
programs toward developing stable, evidence-supported housing
programs for the PRCS population.

Or,
If 10% or more of the PRCS population is in need of substance-abuse
treatment, then the county SHALL put forward at least [a specified
percentage range] of its probationary program funding toward
evidenced-based substance abuse programs.

The specified percentage would be based on the average cost of
these services per probationer, multiplied by the number of probationers
transferring from state control who need services. Of course, as many
critics have pointed out, realignment does not require counties to collect
data on their realignment population, and thus it will be difficult for
counties to know the needs of people in their PRCS systems.209 The
proposed legislative language here would either (1) require counties to
base their funding allocation on predicted needs, which many counties
included in their plans and can be drawn from parolee and county data,
or (2) be accompanied by requirements for data collection, which is
suggested by the ACLU.210
Pew Center on the States offers similar language in recommending
that state legislation provide mandatory spending and population
requirements for how counties utilize “[e]vidence-based programs to
reduce recidivism.”211 For example, to require counties to provide
208

See, e.g., Kurlychek, supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., HOPPER ET AL., supra note 10, at 41.
210
Id. at 9-10. Specifically, the ACLU recommends that the state mandate standardized
collection of data to enable “policy-makers to monitor which policies and programs are working to
reduce recidivism and reliance upon incarceration, and to base policy and budget decisions on those
findings.” Id. at 41.
211
PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 127.
209
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services for probationers, Pew recommends such language as the
following:
(1) The Agency shall adopt policies, rules and regulations that within
[four] years of the effective date of this Act result in at least [75%] of
supervised individuals being supervised in accordance with evidencebased practices.
(2) Within [four] years of the effective date of this Act, [75%] of State
monies expended on programs shall be for programs that are in
accordance with evidence-based practices.212

Alternatively, S.B. 678 could be amended to focus its incentivebased funding primarily on rewarding counties for their creation of
successful programs and for demonstrating probationers’ participation
and achievement in the programs.213 With the enactment of A.B. 109,
the legislation has been in conflict because S.B. 678 rewards counties
with funding based on how many people counties divert from going to
prison.214 Now that counties will no longer have the option to send many
low-level probationers to prison, S.B. 678 will potentially be rewarding
counties for retaining offenders that counties have no choice but to
keep.215 In fact, recently the State has dramatically reduced funding for
S.B. 678 to just under $35 million for the 2013-2014 fiscal year and is
amid discussions about revising the funding distribution formula.216
Basing the funding incentives on the counties’ demonstration of creating
and tracking these programs would make S.B. 678 complement A.B. 109
rather than conflict with it.
The Pew Center offers exemplary language that, if integrated into
S.B. 678, would have just this effect. Pew’s suggested legislative
incentive-based probation reform language would mandate that
supervision agencies

212

Id. ch. 1, 1 (emphasis added).
In order for this to be most effective, S.B. 678 could be extended to cover the PRCS and
Mandatory Supervision populations created by realignment. The Administrative Office of the Courts
recommends this. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 73, at 38.
214
TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 15.
215
TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 11 (The “realignment of certain adult offenders from the state to
counties will artificially’ reduce the future percentage of probationers that counties send to state
prison, thereby unintentionally making them eligible for more [S.B. 678] funding. This is because
the realignment plan will (1) increase the number of individuals on probation and (2) make certain
crimes ineligible for prison sentences.”). The new budget formula should be released with the
State’s 2013-2014 budget.
216
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 73, at 15. See also TAYLOR, supra note 19, at
15.
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set up a system to track and report regularly on key performance
measures as defined by the American Correctional Association. The
measures are: recidivism, employment, substance use, payment of
victim restitution, compliance with “no contact” orders, and the
overall performance of supervised individuals as measured by the type
of discharge from supervision.217

Instead of measuring success primarily based on the number of
probationers counties keep from state prison, Pew measures success
based on the success of probationers within a county’s reentry system.218
For example, Pew suggests that measuring (and then subsequently
rewarding) counties’ success based on their creation of substance abuse
treatment programs would require counties to report to a state agency the
“[n]umber of offender substance abuse tests for which the results were
negative in the past 12 months divided by the number of tests
administered in the past 12 months.”219 S.B. 678 could be amended to
include similar language and to broaden its measurements of success to
include housing and education access for probationers as well.
It is important that the State provide these funding and program
development requirements as soon as possible, as realignment is already
well underway, and reentry and rehabilitation services are already
needed. The Legislature erred too far on the side of county autonomy
and failed to put teeth into the law that would require counties to address
the needs of their probation and PRCS populations. For a probationary
system as loosely structured as is California’s, if the probation
departments are going to be doing more work than ever—essentially
bearing the brunt of the State’s prison depopulation efforts—then the
State should provide more structure to ensure that the counties are
accomplishing the intended goals of the legislation. Adding the
suggested guidelines to A.B. 117 would ensure that counties provide at
least a minimum of reentry and rehabilitation services to their PRCS and
probation populations.
CONCLUSION
If the Legislature was serious about fulfilling its stated intent for
realignment and the Supreme Court’s suggestion to reduce population by
addressing systemic causes of recidivism through reentry and
rehabilitation programs, it should have mandated that counties create
217

PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 127, ch. 5, at 1.
Id.
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Id. ch. 5, at 9.
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reentry programs. Without these funding requirements, it is unlikely that
counties will create sufficient reentry systems on their own. Counties
have a history of not addressing the needs of their probation population,
and their response thus far to realignment have generally focused more
on jails than on creating reentry programs. But it is these very programs
that could make realignment work—by keeping probationers from
returning to jail or prison. Amending realignment to include funding
requirements like those suggested above would ensure that state funding
for realignment is used to augment these services. Without these
guidelines, the rhetoric and statutory language of rehabilitation and
probation reform are hollow and myopic. As expressed in the quote that
opens this Comment, this type of confusing or contradictory policy—in
which rehabilitation is encouraged but not taken seriously enough to
enforce—causes the State to appear that it was never interested in the
success of those exiting incarceration. Realignment becomes nothing
more than merely shuffling people from prison to jail, and ultimately,
shuffling the problems that led to realignment in the first place.
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